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Do Private Property Rights Promote Sustainability?
Examining Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries
Adam Soliman†
Global marine fish resources have suffered from serious overfishing
since 1950, and many marine resources are highly threatened. Various management regimes, including, but not limited to individual
transferable quotas (ITQs), have been implemented worldwide to
regulate fisheries. It is believed that ITQs have improved fishery
management and restored declining fisheries to be sustainable.
ITQs are designed both to: (1) provide an incentive to the individual
fishers to protect the fishery by creating a financial interest in the
fishery’s ongoing productivity, and (2) enable the government to
manage the fishery effectively. Using this system, governments are
able to limit the extraction of fish from the ocean. ITQs incentivize
Fishers to limit their consumption in order to keep their ITQ and
ensure there is future value in their ITQ. This study focuses on
whether property rights, as implemented in the form of ITQs, effectively increase the sustainability of a fishery. While ITQs do confer
proprietary interests upon the quota holders, these interests fall
short of full private ownership in a legal sense. Contrary to some
claims, the property rights provided by ITQs are neither necessary
nor sufficient to guarantee good stewardship of a fishery. However,
this study argues these rights do create strong incentives for stewardship, and have improved sustainability in many fisheries around
the world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950s the world’s marine fish resources have suffered
from serious overfishing,1 and many fisheries are in great danger.
Various management regimes have been implemented around the world
in an effort to overcome this problem. One prominent management
regime is the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. While ITQs
exist in many jurisdictions, the schemes in New Zealand, Australia,
Iceland, Canada and the United States are best known and most
discussed. This study will use these schemes to understand the benefits
of ITQs. An ITQ is, essentially, a license held by an individual or an
organization, which provides them with a share of the total allowable
catch (TAC) of fish.2 Like all licenses, it is a privilege allowed by the
government of that nation. The specifics of each ITQ system may differ,
but they all assign to individual fishers or companies a specific
1. Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 SCI.
MAG. 788 (2006).
2. Cindy Chu, Thirty Years Later: The Global Growth of ITQs and Their Influence on Stock
Status in Marine Fisheries, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 217 (2008).
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proportion of the amount that the government determines it can safely be
fished. The TAC is generally based upon scientific data.3 ITQs are called
transferable quotas because they can be bought and sold by any legally
defined “person”4and they can be worth a significant amount of money.
ITQs are a privilege and not property because they exist solely at the
discretion of the government. Many analysts believe that the ITQ system
has preserved sustainability in fisheries more effectively than the
alternatives.5 Other researchers, however, do not believe that ITQs
contribute significantly to sustainability,6 and heated arguments
sometimes result. Reviewing and assessing these arguments is one of the
main purposes of this paper.
Although it may not be immediately obvious, arguments about the
effectiveness of ITQs, as a means of ensuring sustainable fisheries, are
closely linked to a more legalistic and theoretical question: Can ITQs be
properly classified as “property rights” or “ownership” in legal terms?
Some theorists consider “Property” a bundle of rights7; these rights may
include the ability to exclude others from the use of the property, the
existence of a judicial relationship between the person and the property,
and the entitlement to derive profit from the property.8 These rights
appear to apply to the “owner” of an ITQ. But can the ITQ truly be
considered “property” if the owner is still subject to government
intervention, up to and including revocation of the ITQ without
compensation? Does this mean that the quota is a mere “interest”, rather
than a right, or that it is only a license or privilege rather than a form of
property?
This paper begins by explaining the nature of ITQs in the context of
historical trends in fisheries regulation. Next, the paper addresses
whether and to what extent ITQs confer property rights. The next section
reviews the important controversy about whether or not property rights in
general and ITQs in particular encourage socially beneficial stewardship,
i.e., the avoidance of overfishing. Then, the author sets out the criticisms
3. Timothy Essington et al., Catch Shares, Fisheries, and Ecological Stewardship: A
Comparative Analysis of Resource Responses to a Rights-Based Policy Instrument, 5
CONSERVATION LETTERS 186, 188 (2012).
4. “Persons” also includes corporations.
5. See, e.g., Gordon R. Munro et al., Impacts of Harvesting Rights in Canadian Pacific
Fisheries, STAT. AND ECON. ANALYSIS SERIES NO. 1-3, 2009, at 6-13; Dietmar Grimm et al.,
Assessing Catch Shares’ Effects: Evidence from Federal United States and Associated British
Columbian Fisheries, 36 MARINE POL’Y 654, 657 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Daniel Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Receits of Fisheries Policy, 34
FISHERIES 280, 290 (2009).
7. BRUCE ZIFF, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 2-5 (1996).
8. Id.
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of ITQs as related to property rights as well as responses to those
criticisms. Finally, the paper will assess the overall value of ITQs as a
fisheries management tool.
This paper will argue that ITQs do confer a form of property right
upon the quota holders.9 The nature of these rights differs significantly
across jurisdictions because of differences in legislation and case law.10
If ITQs were truly property rights, as opposed to privileges, then
.governments could not take them without some form of compensation..
If ITQs were truly property rights rather than privileges, then they would
include the bundle of property rights associated with property law in that
jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, ITQs have been recognized as
property11 for certain specific purposes, while in others they are mere
privileges.12 In all jurisdictions, however, ITQs do not provide their
holders with all the characteristics of legal “ownership.” This is because
ownership entails a specific set of rights including the right to be
compensated if the property is taken, while ITQ licenses do not grant the
right to compensation. It is possible that the TAC for a particular year,
and therefore the proportion that an ITQ holder may catch, can be zero.
With respect to stewardship, proponents of ITQs generally argue
that the absence of property rights is the source of the economic and
sustainability problems in fisheries.13 Consequently, they predict that
creating such rights should, in principle, alter the fishers’ behavior
voluntarily towards sustainment of the resource.14 Others claim that
private property rights are equally or more likely to motivate exploitation
rather than stewardship. Thus, other legal mandates or constraints are
required in order to ensure stewardship.15 This paper will show that for
socially beneficial stewardship behavior to exist, exclusive private
ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient. It will be argued, however,
that a regime which includes appropriately structured property rights
9. See also Seth Macinko & Sarah Schumann, The Process of “Property”: Stasis and Change
in Lobster Management in Southern New England, 33 VT. L. REV. 73 (2008).
10. Id.
11. Such as New Zealand and Australia.
12. For example, Canadian and US common law treat ITQ licenses as property in some
instances similarly to the division of estates and divorce
13. See e.g., Donald R. Leal, Homesteading the Oceans: The Case For Property Rights in U.S.
Fisheries, PERC POL’Y SERIES, Aug. 2000, at 1-36, available at http://perc.org/sites/default/files/
ps19.pdf; Ragnar Arnason, A Review of International Experiences with ITQs (Annex to Future
Options for UK Fish Quota Management, CEMARE REP. NO. 58, 1 (2002), http://www.port.ac.uk/
research/cemare/publications/pdffiles/reportspdf/filetodownload,103922,en.pdf.
14. Arnason, supra note 13, at 1; Chu, supra note 2.
15. Bromley, supra note 6; Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheries for
the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 646 (2004).
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does provide effective incentives for socially beneficial stewardship, and
is likely to require less enforcement effort and cost than regimes that
provide no such rights. This does not, however, mean that stronger
property rights are always better. Effective conservation actions often
necessitate some limitations on the scope of the property rights that are
conferred by ITQs.16
II. THE NATURE OF ITQS
A. Fisheries and “The Tragedy of the Commons”
The theory of the “tragedy of the commons”17 explains how
multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally on behalf of
their own self-interest, can deplete a shared limited resource, even when
each knows that it is not in his own interest, nor in anyone’s long-term
interest.18 The theory is widely known, but it can be argued whether it
applies to certain specific situations. Fisheries, for example, have been
described within the tragedy of the commons model but have significant
limitations.19 Even across different jurisdictions, the general economic
theory of the tragedy of the commons applies because of the inherent
nature of fisheries.20 A fish stock is precisely this type of resource. The
stock is shared, but (in the absence of any kind of regulation) each fisher
owns only (and all of) those fish that he can catch. In English common
law, this is known as the “rule of capture.”21 In such a fishery, it will be
in the interest of an individual fisher to acquire as much fish as he can,
which he can then of course sell for private profit.22 However, this will
cause overfishing and exhaustion of the stock, which is not in anyone’s

16. These limitations are consistent with the FAO’s ecosystem approach to fisheries
management which suggests that the government should be able to lower TACs if needed to
conserve the resource, and not be impeded by other issues.
17. Garrett W. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. MAG. 1243 (1968).
18. Id. at 1243-1248.
19. See, e.g., Donald R Leal, Community Run Fisheries: Preventing the Tragedy of the
Commons, PROP. AND ENVT. RES. CTR., http://perc.org/articles/community-run-fisheries-0 (last
visited June 4, 2014).
20. Daniel Benjamin, Fisheries are a Classic Example of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” 19
PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. 1 (2001), available at http://perc.org/articles/fisheries-are-classicexample-tragedy-commons.
21. Anthony Scott, Moving Through the Narrows: From Open Access to ITQs and SelfGovernment, in USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 105 (Ross Shotton ed.,
2000).
22. Macinko & Schumann, supra note 9.
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interest.23 Every member of the group suffers when the stock
disappears.24
The tragedy of the commons applies to many environmental
goods.25 Not surprisingly, the tragedy of the commons has been widely
recognized to exist in traditional open access fisheries,26 although at
times the predicted over exploitation never occurs due to a lack of
demand created by a lack of access to markets. Most often, however,
empirical evidence shows clearly that over-fishing has occurred.27 This
has led governments around the world to restrict access to fishing in an
attempt to save the common property fish stock.28 Proposed solutions
usually include a permit system, in which the government either limits
the rights of use or the conversion of the public good into private
property. Thus, the permit system provides the individual with an
incentive to maintain the property in good state.29
In most cases, the first step was the introduction of licenses.30 This
was quickly followed by strict conditions on the licenses, often including
an aggregate catch limit or TAC for the entire fishery. However,
problems continued to exist.31 Fishermen developed strategies to evade
restrictions on their licenses in order to catch the same amount of fish.
For example, where fishing was reduced to a limited number of days per
year, fishermen were quick to develop ways to fish in order to catch the
same amount of fish within the reduced time period.32 Similarly, when
regulations for vessels were introduced, fishermen were quick to enhance
their fishing nets, enabling themselves to catch the same amount of fish
with their smaller vessels.33 In other words, fishermen continued to find
loopholes in the system that allowed them to continue overfishing.34

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Patrick A. Nickler, A Tragedy of the Commons in Coastal Fisheries: Contending
Prescriptions for Conservation, and the Case of the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 549, 576 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PNAS
15181, 15182-15183 (2007).
27. Chu, supra note 2 at 9.
28. Munro et al., supra note 5.
29. Christine Stewart, Legislating for Property Rights in Fisheries, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 4-5 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5672e/y5672e00.pdf.
30. See, e.g., id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4-5
34. Id.
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B. The Transition to Output Control and Individual Quotas
Governments then started to restrict the amount of fish, and also
entitlements to certain amounts of fish.35 Thus, the regulatory approach
shifted from input control (controlling the amount of effort, type of gear,
etc.) to output control (controlling the amount of fish fishermen can
catch).36 Under an ITQ system, the regulator determines a total allowable
catch (TAC) for each species of fish.37 The TAC is then divided into
individual quotas (IQs), which are allocated to individual fishers or
organizations.38 If regulations allow IQ holders to sell, buy or lease their
quotas, then the quotas are individual transferable quotas, or ITQs.39
Most but not all IQ schemes allow at least some trading to occur, and so
most of these schemes are in fact ITQ regimes.40 Trading quotas is
generally justified on the grounds of economic efficiency. The fishermen
with the lowest costs will be able to place the highest bids for the ITQs.41
Although ITQs are meaningless without a TAC, it is entirely
possible to implement a TAC without ITQs. When a TAC is used
without individual quotas, the regulator sets the TAC, and then allows
licensed fishers to fish until the TAC has been caught in aggregate.42 The
regulator then closes the season, and any further fishing is prohibited
until the next season opens.43 This type of regulation has been widely
used in many countries.44 For example, the United States and Canada
used this approach for several Pacific fisheries before the introduction of
ITQs in the 1990s.45 Unfortunately, this type of regulation has failed in
many ways. It has not effectively prevented overfishing46, yet has caused
considerable economic hardship for fishers.47
To understand the reasons why many researchers predict that ITQs
will help to prevent fisheries from falling victim to the tragedy of the
commons, consider the difference between TAC-based regimes without
35. Suzi Kerr, James Sanchirico & Richard Newell, Evaluating the New Zealand Individual
Transferable Quota Market for Fisheries Management, (Motu Working Paper No. 2003-02),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441061.
36. Id.
37. Stewart, supra note 29.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Arnason, supra note 13.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Munro et al., supra note 5.
46. The enforcement by the regulators was not as stringent as that of IQs.
47. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 6-13.
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IQs and those with IQs. Where a TAC is not divided into individual
shares, each fisher is entitled only to whatever amount he can catch
before the total fleet reaches the TAC.48 This situation, called the “race to
fish”, forces every fisher to catch as much as he can as quickly as he can,
regardless of what effect this may have on the health of the stock.49 No
fisherman can afford to take any action that would help protect the stock
if that action would slow down his catch rate.50 If he did, the direct result
would be a reduction in his total catch and his total profit. In contrast,
where a TAC is divided into IQs, each fisher is entitled to that share
regardless of how long he takes to catch it, and regardless of the actions
of the rest of the fleet.51 Therefore, actions that would help protect the
stock are not automatically penalized.52
Furthermore, because an ITQ is a percentage share of a TAC, and
the TAC can change from year to year, it is in each fisherman’s selfinterest to take actions that will increase the TAC in future years by
increasing the size and value of his share.53 In theory, this should
motivate a fisherman to voluntarily avoid cheating (that is, catching more
than the quantity allowed today by his ITQ), because such cheating
might reduce the future TAC, and therefore reduce the future quantity he
can catch under the same ITQ.54This paper will focus on whether this
theory actually works to encourage sustainable fishing practices. Before
addressing that question, however, it is necessary to understand the legal
issues surrounding ITQs. Do they confer property rights on their holders,
and if so, to what extent? The next section discusses the nature of
property rights in general, and then analyzes ITQs in that context.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ITQS
A. The Nature of Property Rights
Many questions have arisen regarding the legal status of ITQs, and
whether they can be considered property.55 Property rights have been

48. Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. MAG.
1678, 1679 (2008).
49. Id.
50. Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCI. MAG. 630 (1973).
51. Dale Squires et al., Individual Transferable Quotas as a Fisheries Management Tool, 3
REV. FISHERIES SCI. 141-169 (1995).
52. Id.
53. Leal, supra note 19.
54. Id.
55. Bromley, supra note 6.
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widely defined and discussed.56 Many different interpretations exist.57
One of the most influential interpretations holds that “property” is a
bundle of rights, and that individual rights within this bundle can be
separated, transferred, removed or added.58 This means that several rights
of property may be attached to a single good.59 For example, one party
may own a house, but if the owner decides to rent it out, then the tenant
may also have rights with respect to that same house. Though the owner
retains ownership, the tenant has the right to occupy and use the premises
to the exclusion of others.
Property is generally understood, in the legal context, as a bundle of
rights associated with some asset, either tangible or intellectual.60 One of
the general assumptions of capitalism is that the capacity to own and
“hold” property provides incentives to improve property, generating
wealth.61 This understanding is the basis for the legal system that seeks to
balance the interests of the property holder with the rest of society. The
result of this is what has been called the “crystals” and the “mud” of
property law.62 These are the hard-edged, well defined areas of the law,
such as what is required for the sale of a piece of property under the law,
and the less defined and harder to fully understand areas. ITQs fall into
this latter camp; they are occasionally treated as though they were
property, and occasionally are not.
One of the classic definitions states that “ownership” is composed
of the following rights: (1) possession, management and control; (2)
income and capital; (3) transfer inter vivos and on death; and (4)
protection at law (for example, from expropriation).63 It is also
recognized that ownership often comes with duties as well as rights,64 for
example, ownership of a firearm. More importantly, the classic definition
states that the rights are not necessarily unfettered and that ownership
may, for example, not be immune from expropriation or seizure.65 Also,
different bundles of rights may exist, and what is recognized as property
56. Stewart, supra note 29.
57. Id.
58. See J.E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. R. 711 (1996);
ZIFF, supra note 7, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Sony Pellissery & Sattwick Dey Biswas, Emerging Property Regimes In India:
What It Holds For the Future of Socio-Economic Rights?, (Nov. 22, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179717.
62. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577-579 (1988).
63. ZIFF, supra note 7 at 2-3.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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under private law, for example, may not receive the same recognition or
protection under criminal law. 66 In Canada, for example, the Supreme
Court determined in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia that aboriginal
title is sui generis, meaning “of its own kind”, or unlike any normal kind
of title.67 This concept is relatively unique to Canada, but has some
interesting implications. In making this ruling, the Court noted several
differences between aboriginal title and non-aboriginal title.68 For one
thing, the range and uses of aboriginal title land is limited to the uses that
“must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land,
which forms the basis of the particular group’s aboriginal title.”69 In
addition, aboriginal title is inalienable, except to the Crown.70 A
community can only hold aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is
constitutionally protected.71
As entitlements to property need to be judicially recognized in order
for property rights to be enforceable, it is the legislature and/or the courts
that validate property claims.72 The other extreme that has been argued
includes Brubaker’s claim that the best methodology for protecting
nature is through “a system of exclusive, transferable rights that has
vested decision-making authority in individuals and firms who own or
occupy land.”73
These property and proprietary interests can result in a variety of
different situations aside from those previously mentioned. Different
types of proprietary “interests” also exist that fall short of true
ownership. They fall short because they, for one reason or another, do
not provide the full body of rights associated with legal ownership. ITQ
licenses fail to compensate individuals for the loss of their property if the
ITQ rights change or the ITQ is revoked. These “interests” are generally
recognized in jurisdictions worldwide, although perhaps under different
names. They include:

66. Id. at 3-4.
67. Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014 (Can.).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ZIFF, supra note 7. Therefore, ‘what is’ a property may very well depend on the jurisdiction
in which such right is claimed. Ziff distinguishes two different approaches used by courts in their
analysis of property rights. One is the ‘attributes approach’, which has a court look at the elements of
the rights in order to determine whether they fit the property picture; the other approach is the
‘purpose’ approach, which very much reflects the needs of society.
73. ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE 19(1995).
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(a) Incorporeal hereditaments: these are rights to have access to, or
to exploit certain land resources.74 Easements and profits a prendre
are two of the more familiar examples.75 Easements are generally
defined as the right to cross or otherwise use someone else’s land
for a specified purpose.76 Easements most commonly appear in cases of adjoining lands, where the owner of one land needs to cross
the other owner’s land to gain access to a public road.77 Easements
cannot be revoked once granted, as they are proprietary interests.78
They can be enforced both against the grantor and third parties.79
Profits a prendre are such interests as mineral rights or water rights,
which allow the grantee to take specific types of natural produce
from another’s land.80 Profits a prendre are more flexible, in that
any kind of use of the land can be granted, whereas easements are
primarily rights to passage.81
(b) License: A license is a permit from an authority to own or use
something, do a particular thing or carry on a trade. Common examples are alcohol or weapons license. There are four types of licenses: (i) bare licenses, (ii) contractual licenses, (iii) licenses by
proprietary estoppels, and (iv) licenses coupled with an interest.82

As different legal concepts which represent partial interests to land, they
receive different protections under the law.
B. Community Property Rights
The concept of communal property rights can be contrasted with
individual property rights. In Canada, this question frequently arises in
the context of property rights in aboriginal communities,83 with a key
difference being how the property rights are allocated. Each individual
member of the community is generally able to access the property in
question, and management is generally operated through the community
74. Daniel K. Brough, Alternatives in Accretion: Why There Is Not Yet an Appropriate Solution
to the Application of Accretion Law to Mineral Estates, 2004 BYU L. REV. 169, 204 (2004).
75. Id.
76. Builders Supplies Co. of Goldsboro, N. C., Inc. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 192 S.E.2d 449
(1972).
77. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1110 (2003).
78. Greenwood v. Rahill, 122 R.I. 759, 412 A.2d 228, 230 (1980).
79. S.H. GOO & ALICE LEE, LAND LAW IN HONG KONG 664 (3d ed. 2009).
80. ZIFF, supra note 7.
81. However, conservation easements were created as a way to compensate landowners for
restricting the use and development of their property. See generally Bill Garber, Conservation
Easements: Growth, Abuses, and Regulation, 72 APPRAISAL J. 175 (2004).
82. GOO & LEE, supra note 79.
83. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014 (Can.).
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as a whole. This situation results in a number of different structural and
management choices, the analysis of which would constitute a paper in
and of itself.
Communal property rights provide an alternate methodology
through which property rights and ITQs can be considered. The Alaskan
Community Quota Entities (CQE)84 is an example of just this model; the
community is able to hold the ITQ as though it were a piece of property
communally held and it is able to manage it in their own way. Other than
adding what is, conceptually, an additional layer of management in the
form of the community, the communal property rights system differs
little from an individual holding property rights. What this does show,
however, is that ITQs can function as a piece of property in both a
communal and a private context.
C. ITQs as Property Rights
With respect to ITQs and property, the most fundamental question
is whether an ITQ confers full ownership of “property” upon the holder,
or rather a “proprietary interest” such as a license coupled with a profit a
prendre. In 2004, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
analyzed the nature of ITQs and their relation to property rights.85 The
FAO’s objective was to help legislators carefully and correctly define
ITQs so as to avoid undesired results, such as costly and time-consuming
compensation claims upon revocation of rights, or full property rights
claims.86 The FAO concluded that although ITQs can be effective tools
to limit the environmental impacts of fishing, they have a variety of
societal effects which may be concerning.87
According to the study, the key features of property are: (1) a
judicial relationship that exists between a person and a thing; (2)
privileges and powers that are open-ended (they cannot be finitely
listed); and (3) a holder that is entitled to self-seekingness (the holder can
derive profit or other benefit from the property).88 If any of these three
features is absent, there is no full property right.89The study then

84. For example, the Community Quota Entities (CQE) in Alaska, as defined in the Federal
Fisheries Regulation. See 50 C.F.R § 679.2.
85. Stewart, supra note 29.
86. Id.
87. Evelyn Pinkerton & Danielle N. Edwards, The Elephant in the Room: The Hidden Costs of
Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas, 33 MARINE POLICY 710 (2009).
88. Stewart, supra note 29.
89. Id. at 9-10.
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examined what happens if any of these elements is absent, and
established two categories of non-ownership situations:90
1. “Quasi-ownership interests” exist in the absence of selfseekingness.91 For example, public officials in public agencies are
not self-seeking—the public derives the benefit, not the official.
Nevertheless, these officials have an interest in whatever they oversee, which is analogous to ownership in some respects.
2. “Non-ownership proprietary interests” lack open-endedness
because their content is limited.92 These interests are usually created
for a very specific purpose so that only very specific rights and
powers are created with regard to the good.93 The study further
breaks this category down into three types of interest:
(a) rights to enjoy some specifically granted category of the use
privileges that are included in the original ownership (i.e. profit
à prendre and easements);
(b) rights to deny the owner of some of his use privileges (i.e.
the right to light and the right to support); and
(c) rights to subtract some monetary value out of the wealth potential of the resource (i.e. mortgages and charges).94

In fisheries, ITQ schemes are private property regimes to the extent
that a fisher who holds a share of the TAC has an exclusive right to
harvest that part of the annual catch of fish.95 They differ from fishing
rights or licensing schemes under which mere “privileges” (such as
permits for fishing activities) are granted.96 In these licensing schemes,
ownership fully remains with the public as represented by the
government, and mere rights to use are granted.97 These rights to use are
not exclusive or transferable.98 ITQs, in contrast, provide exclusive rights
to harvest.99 It is this authorization (rather than the fish) that can be sold,

90. Id. at 10.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Macinko & Bromley, supra note 15.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Stewart, supra note 29, at 15.
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leased and dealt with by the holder100; therefore, property rights may
exist with regard to the quota, which is the exclusive right to harvest.101
The right to harvest is far from unlimited.102 In a bid to protect the
natural resource at stake, nations restrict and limit this entitlement.103 If
the natural resource continues to deplete, states will generally wish to be
able to revoke or reduce these harvest rights.104 In order to avoid lengthy
procedures and allow for swift management, such restrictions are usually
laid down in law. The ITQ is framed in such a way as to avoid
recognizing it as “property” in a legal sense105; some laws speak of
“quotas,” some describe the rights as “quotas allocated to a license,” and
others confer “entitlements” under “licenses or permits.”106
Even though it is clear that “full” property rights are never granted,
the result of these descriptions is usually that the rights are ambiguous
and open to interpretation—coincidentally, much like actual property
rights.107 The effort to avoid recognition as “property” is the reason why
quotas are usually granted for free; governments generally want the ITQ
to be seen as a restricted license, permit or quota—that is, as a
proprietary interest that does not amount to full ownership—and fear that
the payment of a fee for such entitlement could give rise to monetary
claims in case of later expropriation, revocation or reduction of that
entitlement.108
There also appears to be a correlation between the presence of
legislation requiring compensation for deprivation of property and the
desire to avoid giving property right status to ITQs.109 In the US, where a
requirement for such compensation is enshrined in the Constitution,
legislation explicitly states that quotas are not property.110 In New
Zealand, where no such constitutional requirement exists, more extensive
property rights are granted using quotas.111
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U. N., THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISHERIES: ISSUES,
TERMINOLOGY, PRINCIPLES, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTLOOK 443
(2003), available at http://ocean.floridamarine.org/efh_coral/pdfs/Ecosystem_Approaches_to_
Fisheries_FAO.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Leal, supra note 19.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Magnuson-Stevenson Fishery Conversation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1853a
(2006).
111. Stewart, supra note 29, at 4-5.
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The study identifies New Zealand and Iceland as the two countries
with the most comprehensive ITQ legal frameworks.112 New Zealand has
a Quota Register that works much like a land title register, retaining
documentation relating to ownership, mortgagee or caveator rights of
ITQs.113 Furthermore, the statute explicitly states that quota holders are
entitled to compensation should their quota be terminated.114 The quotas
can also be freely transferred. Finally, the quotas are explicitly
permanent in nature, although the quantum of allocation depends on the
annual TAC.115
The New Zealand system contrasts starkly with the situation in the
USA, for example, where legislation explicitly provides that ITQs do not
create any kind of property right, and that no compensation is payable in
case of revocation of the rights.116 US legislation describes ITQs
explicitly as permits only.117 Stewart summarizes this system as “based
on the concepts of the people’s ownership of the resource, the
government’s sovereign right to conserve and manage it, and an openaccess regime.”118 Many have argued that the right granted by the United
States is more of a “revocable privilege” than any kind of property
right.119
Canada, similarly, is reluctant to grant property status to ITQs.120 Its
legislation therefore explicitly states that no property rights are granted
and refers, inter alia, to a buy-back scheme rather than “compensation,”
as compensation is normally reserved for expropriation of property.
Canadian legislation explicitly defines licenses as a “privilege,” not as
“property.”121
However, legislation is not the only relevant consideration as the
courts may establish precedents in case law that differ from the
intentions of the legislators.122 The FAO study notes that licenses that are
(1) permanent; (2) exclusive; (3) transferable; and (4) secure are
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, 27 R.S.N.Z. § 2 & 28ZA (1991).
115. Id.
116. Stewart, supra note 29.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 86.
119. See, e.g., Leal, supra note 13; Arnason, supra note 13, at 14-25.
120. BEIJER INT’L INST. OF ECOLOGICAL ECON. & THE WORLD BANK, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES 91 (Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe eds.,
1995).
121. David G. Henley, The Property Status of Fishery Licences, 28 Dalhousie L. J. 501, 502503 (2005); New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, 27 R.S.N.Z. §§ 2, 28ZA (1991).
122. Stewart, supra note 29, at 11.
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considered very similar to property rights by some courts.123 However,
most fishing rights and licenses only carry some of these characteristics,
and only carry them to a certain extent.124
The precise status of fishing rights depends in part on the statute
under which they are created.125 Some courts, however, have
distinguished different scenarios; protection of the right between private
parties, in contrast to protection of the right between a private party and
the state.126 Often, courts have been much more willing to find that
property rights exist in the first scenario than in the second.127 Finally,
even in regard to these questions, courts hold different views, stemming
mostly from property doctrines and relevant constitutional provisions.128
Historically, it has been recognized that property in fish is vested in
the public.129 This was also established in the leading US case of Arnold
v Mundy,130 which found that the property in navigable waters and the
submerged lands beneath them was vested in the sovereign, not for the
sovereign’s use but for the use of citizens.131 However, largely in
response to the reality of over-fishing, it has also been recognized that
this public property right is subject to abrogation by statute.132
Stewart also points out that it is necessary for states to classify
fishing rights as less than property rights, as anything else would violate
the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, which holds that no one can give
what he does not have (own).133 As the property of fish lies with the
public rather than with the government itself, the legislator is not
authorized to transfer such property.134 This problem is avoided when the
state hands out licenses and permits rather than full property rights.135
In New Zealand, courts treated ITQs as property to some extent,
with the court in Jensen v. Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries
&The Quota Appeal Authority,136 classifying ITQs as “valuable assets.”
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at 14-17.
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id. at 103.
129. See, e.g., Harper v. Minister for Sea Fisheries & Others, 168 CLR 314 (Tasmania, 1989).
130. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821), as confirmed by Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S.
367 (1842).
131. Id.
132. Harper v. Minister for Sea Fisheries & Others, 168 CLR 314 (Tasmania, 1989).
133. Stewart, supra note 29, at 90.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Jenssen v. Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries & The Quota Appeal Authority
(unreported) CA 313/91 (N.Z.).
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However, it has also been held that ITQs can be revoked without an
entitlement to compensation.137 The Court of Appeals in New Zealand
Federation of Commercial Fishermen Inc. v. Minister of Fisheries138
described fishing rights as a “species of property” that is subject to the
provisions of the legislation which creates them.
Australia has granted limited property right status to ITQs. In
Edwards v. Olsen139, the Court held that licenses were clearly property,
“absent some express statutory provision to the contrary,” because
licenses are transferable.140 The approach in Edwards was slightly
different than the approach in cases between private parties and the state.
In the leading case, Harper v. Minister for Sea Fisheries & Others141,
fishing rights were considered “akin” to full property rights and were
said to be like profit a prendre, but ultimately were not considered full
property rights. As they are not full property rights, they are subject to
uncompensated revocation if necessary.142
US courts, on the other hand, tend to treat ITQs as not being a form
of property. One case described ITQs as “transferable permits to fish for
a fixed percentage of the annual aggregate catch quota for the species
and area.”143 The court in Foss v. National Marine Fisheries Service144,
took a somewhat different approach; it classified the ITQ permit as
“property,” but simultaneously stated that there was no property claim in
the fish themselves.
Like the US, Canada has usually been reluctant to treat ITQs as
property. In Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada145, the Supreme Court
considered that a fishing license was not property under common law,
but rather a license coupled with a proprietary interest in the harvest.
Nevertheless, considering then the “major commercial” value of the
license and the fact that they can be sold and leased, it held that these
licenses were property within the (limited) meaning of the Banking and

137. Cooper v. Attorney-General, [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (N.Z.). Note that unlike other
jurisdictions, there is no Constitutional provision in New Zealand stating that property can be
deprived only against payment of compensation.
138. New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen Inc. v. Minister of Fisheries,
CP237/95, Appeal CA 82/97, CA 83/97, CA 96/97.
139. Edwards v. Olsen (1996) 67 SASR 266; [1996] SASC 5703 (Austl.).
140. See Kelly v. Kelly (1990) 92 ALR 74 (Austl.).
141. Harper v. Minister for Sea Fisheries & Others, 168 CLR 314 (Tasmania, 1989).
142. Id.
143. Sea Watch Int’l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1991).
144. Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998).
145. Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada, [2008] SCJ No 60, [2008] SCR 166.
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Insolvency Act.146 This implies that the licenses (which, it should be
noted, are not ITQs) are proprietary interests at the least.
The property rights status of Canadian ITQs was also tested in
Malcolm v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries). In this case, Graeme
Malcolm, on behalf of all commercial halibut license holders, sought
judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Fisheries to change the
split of TAC from 88% commercial with 12% recreational to 85%
commercial with 15% recreational.147 The reduction in ITQs held by the
license holders resulted in fewer pounds of halibut that could be landed
and sold by the applicant and other commercial fisherman.148 The parties
to this lawsuit agreed that the appropriate scope of review was
reasonableness, putting the question to the court as to whether the
Minister’s action was purely administrative, a policy decision, or a
political decision (which would not be justiciable).149 This was an
application of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, which described
reasonableness as a flexible deferential standard that varies with the
context and the nature of the impugned administrative act.150 The
applicant claimed that the action was primarily legislative in nature (thus,
justiciable), and sought to utilize the doctrines of both promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectations to further the claim.151 The court
found both of these to be inapplicable to the current case.152 Promissory
estoppel did not apply because although the applicant established that he
and other commercial license holders relied upon representations by the
Minister, which was not sufficient because promissory estoppel cannot
prevent a minister from exercising a broad statutory mandate to act in the
public interest.153 Similarly, legitimate expectations can only be used to
challenge the process used to make the decision, not the ultimate
result.154 This case confirmed the power of the Minister to make changes
to the TAC and alter the distribution if the need necessitates.155 This
change can be done without court interference and is further proof that
ITQs in Canada do not confer full ownership because the court has, in

146. Id.
147. Malcom v. Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, [2013] F.C. 363 (Can.).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.R. 190 (Can.).
151. Malcom v. Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, [2013] F.C. 363 (Can.).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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effect, held that they are privileges that can be revoked without
compensation.156
Furthermore, in the Canadian case of Knowles Estate v. Knowles,157
the main point of contention between the parties asked who was entitled
to benefit from the sale of the late Carl Alvin Knowles’ fishing licenses.
The Court held that the fishing licenses were not marital property under
the Matrimonial Property Act,158 but nevertheless were “business assets”
which could be divided under section 22 (2.1) of the Devolution of
Estates Act 159. There is a general similarity between this finding and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Saulnier; both courts did not consider
licenses to be “property” in the full sense, but found that they were
subject to certain provisions of certain specific statutes.
When comparing case law from different jurisdictions, it is
necessary to consider the different contexts in which these cases arise.160
The precise nature of the property right involved is seldom the turning
point of a case. More often, property rights are discussed as a point of no
ultimate legal significance.161 Rather than, for example, granting fishers
certain rights so as to improve their security in relation to that right,
many cases focus on the possibility of granting secure proprietary
interests to third parties, such as moneylenders.162 As a result, the
question of property is considered in relation to different laws, from
differing perspectives and for different purposes, which leads to multiple
and differing interpretations.163
Stewart concludes that ITQs do not constitute full private
ownership164; the characteristics of transferability (whether the property
can be transferred), exclusivity (whether the owner is able to exclude
others from the use of the good), security (whether the entitlement can be
revoked or determined by the state) and durability (whether ownership is
unlimited in time and doesn’t expire) are not present to their fullest
degree.165 However, ITQs do have certain qualities in common with full
property rights, such as the fact that they can be leased and sold.166 Most

156. Id.
157. Knowles v. Knowles, [2011] NBQB 43 (Can.).
158. Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A 2000, c. M-8 (Can.).
159. Devolution of Estates Act, RSNB 1973, c. D-9 (Can.).
160. Stewart, supra note 29.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada, [2008] SCJ No 60, [2008] SCR 166.
163. Stewart, supra note 29.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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jurisdictions recognize that quotas are at least a form of profit à prendre,
and in some cases, somewhat more.167 Sometimes, they are even
(confusingly) considered “property” for such purposes as insolvency
legislation, as in the Saulnier case from Canada.168 Nevertheless, because
of the limitations on security and durability, quotas are more accurately
described as “non-ownership property interests,” than as complete
property rights that are tantamount to full ownership.169
D. Driesen’s Criticism of Property Rights
Many researchers have criticized the use of property law to attempt
to solve environmental problems. Driesen posits that property is often
utilized as a force for stability within economic systems, but that modern
property law often undervalues social functions of property.170 These
concepts are further developed in the Coase Theorem171, which states
that property is a legal concept that serves only to provide value to assets
so negotiation can occur.172 This supports Driesen’s view that property is
a tool for stabilizing complex economic systems. The result of these
positions is that private property rights are focused rights with which an
economic value can be associated, rather than the social concepts of
ownership. This conceptualization, however, requires that a consequence
of an action be known in order for that consequence to be reflected in the
economic valuation. An example is the difficulty of obtaining complete
knowledge about environmental effects, which results in these effects
being ignored when the value of a piece of property is determined. The
value of a given amount of quota under an ITQ system, for instance,
depends on whether the TAC is correct—something which is rarely
knowable with certainty.
Driesen’s view that property cannot address the environment is
based on his view of the inherent purpose of property. Driesen suggests
that property is merely a method of associating value for negotiation and
for the assignment of scarce assets throughout society.173 Driesen’s
theory of property rights is not inconsistent with communal rights,
however. Nevertheless, if this concept of property is used to address
environmental issues, Driesen predicts that it will fail because of market
167. Id.
168. Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada, [2008] SCJ No 60, [2008] SCR 166.
169. Stewart, supra note 29.
170. DAVID DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
171. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960).
172. DRIESEN, supra note 178.
173. Id.
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inefficiencies. Although Hardin’s model identifies systemic risks to the
system, what it fails to do is determine what would happen if the herders
were entirely unaware as to how the environment would be affected by
their actions. The situation in most fisheries is not that fishers suffer from
a complete lack of knowledge, but rather that there is incomplete
knowledge that can still address the problem at hand. Perfect knowledge
is not required to be able to extrapolate the safe levels of fishing
required, and the herder’s assumption that is used as a criticism of the
Hardin model does not apply, particularly when the resources of a
government can be used to address the informational problems.
IV. EVALUATING ITQS
A. Introduction
Researchers and academics are engaged in an important debate
about whether property rights and ITQs are an effective and costefficient method of preventing over-fishing and maintaining sustainable
fisheries.174 This debate is made even more complex by the multiple
definitions of “property rights,” described in the previous section.175 In
many cases, different researchers reach different conclusions and hold
different opinions because they have unwittingly used different
definitions of “property rights” and “ownership.”176 As a result, many of
the arguments are difficult to analyze, and even more difficult to
resolve.177
The following subsections first describe the arguments against ITQs
as an effective means of promoting sustainability, as expressed by Daniel
Bromley.178 The next subsection unpacks the arguments in favor of
ITQ’s for promoting sustainability. Following this section, a short
discussion of some criticisms of ITQ’s, unrelated to sustainability, but
arise as a result of viewing ITQ’s as property rights.
B. Bromley’s Criticisms of ITQs for Sustainability
Daniel Bromley’s 2009 paper ‘Abdicating Responsibility’ attacked many
earlier studies that supported and promoted ITQs.179 Bromley argued that
174. George J. Mannina, Jr., Is There A Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual. Fishing
Quotas?, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 5, 49 (1997).
175. Id
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Bromley, supra note 6, at 281.
179. Id.
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it was a “myth” to claim that a fishery can be sustained using a free
market system without government intervention. In his view, a system
with catch share allowance requires government intervention and
management in order to function well.180 His arguments are based on
what he calls the ‘five core deceits’ of fisheries’ policy:181
(1) Over-fishing can be blamed on missing property rights;
(2) Private ownership is necessary and sufficient for socially
beneficial stewardship;
(3) ITQs must be of infinite life and freely tradable in order to
produce the desired efficiency and stewardship properties;
(4) ITQs are private property; and
(5) ITQs are necessary and sufficient to produce efficiency, and to
maximize resource rent, in a fishery.182
Bromley correctly points out that many economists use terms such
as “property rights” and “ownership” vaguely and inconsistently.183
Stated earlier in this paper, using vague and inconsistent terms is a
common problem that makes it difficult to understand, compare and
analyze arguments. It also tends to create and intensify disagreements.
Unfortunately, Bromley does not state a detailed and specific definition
of “property rights” either, making his reasoning no easier to work with
than the arguments of those whom he criticizes.184
With respect to the first “core deceit,” Bromley neglects to present
any argument showing why he believes to be false.185 As stated earlier in
this paper, the view that over-fishing is a result of missing property rights
is based on the theory of the “tragedy of the commons.”186 According to
this theory, when fishers have rights to any fish that have not been
caught, fishers act out of self-interest and seek to catch every possible
fish before someone else can.187 In order to show that this claim is, or
could be, a “deceit,” Bromley needs to outline the reasoning and then
show how it is flawed. He does neither.188

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 282.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Nickler, supra note 25.
187. Hardin, supra note 17.
188. Bromley, supra note 6 at 281.
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Bromley offers an alternative explanation for over-fishing: people
over-fish because “their desire for the control of future value exceeds the
rate at which a renewable natural resource can produce future value.”189
While this is almost certainly true, it is little more than a restatement of
one of the fundamental assumptions of economics, which is that people
will always prefer more value to less. Therefore, it is true about any
economic actor in any situation. It does not explain why fisheries are so
often over-fished while other economic activities appear to be
sustainable without significant intervention.
Bromley further claims that over-fishing can be (and should be)
prevented, not by applying property rights, but by imposing constraints
and penalties.190 In principle, this is true. Sufficiently intense (and costly)
enforcement can probably preserve a fish stock. Bromley’s evidence,
unfortunately, refutes his claim rather than supports it. He says: “Human
societies, over a rather long history, have figured out how to prevent all
manner of unwanted activities and outcomes—from child pornography to
organized dog fighting;”191 and, argues that the same approach can work
to prevent over-fishing. Unfortunately for Bromley’s argument (and for
all of us), child pornography and organized dog fighting are both alive
and well, despite society’s best efforts.
Bromley’s second “core deceit” is partly a restatement of the
first.192 The first “deceit,” according to Bromley, is the claim that overfishing is caused by the absence of property rights.193 This is equivalent
to a claim that property rights are necessary to prevent over-fishing, and
this is half of the second “deceit.” In full, Bromley’s second “deceit” is
the claim that property rights are both necessary and sufficient for
preventing over-fishing.194
Bromley first claims that property rights are not necessary;
according to him, the only necessary condition for sustainability is that
“a renewable resource will be used (“drawn down”) at a rate that does
not diminish its capacity to reproduce itself in subsequent time
periods.”195 While this is true, it is little more than a definition of
sustainability. It does not address the question that economists and
fisheries managers are interested in, which is how this goal is best
achieved. According to Bromley, private property is not necessary to
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 282.
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achieve this goal. For example, users do not deplete timber resources in
the US, to which no private property rights are granted.196
Bromley also argues that private ownership is not sufficient because
a private owner will prefer to derive income now rather than in the
future, and, therefore, will exhaust the resource.197 As evidence for this,
he points to the fact that even though land is privately owned, laws such
as the Washington State Forest Practices Act,198 and government
agencies such as the Soil Conservation Bureau, are often required to
protect the land and its produce. If private ownership were sufficient to
ensure good stewardship, then such interventions would be redundant.199
As further evidence that private ownership is not sufficient in itself,
Bromley points to the fact that most ITQ schemes involve substantial
enforcement efforts, such as mandatory cameras on fishing vessels and
physical dockside checks.200 In his view, this demonstrates that ITQs are
not creating a strong enough motivation for fishers to choose voluntarily
to conserve.201 He suggests that fishers do not perceive their ITQs as
reasonable guarantees of significant long-term value because they expect
that the fish stock could easily be destroyed by some factor other than
overfishing, such as climate changes or pollution.202
This aspect of Bromley’s interpretation is questionable on at least
two grounds. First, especially in the light of the management failure of
many of the regimes that existed before the introduction of IQs, it
appears likely that enforcement has been inadequate in the past.203 If this
were true, then the additional enforcement effort, that accompanied the
introduction of IQs, would have been equally necessary if the previous
regime had remained in place.204
Second, the fact that a certain set of laws requires enforcement does
not in itself mean that those laws are failing to set up the right
incentives.205 No one would claim that contract law, for example, fails to
encourage desirable behavior merely on the grounds that it is backed up
by a large and costly enforcement structure. The fact that contracts need
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09 (1993).
199. Bromley, supra note 6 at 282.
200. Id. at 283.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 282.
203. Nickler, supra note 25, at 575-576.
204. Dietmar Grimm et al., Can Catch Shares Reduce the U.S. Federal Deficit?, 3 J.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 118, 122 (2010).
205. Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with A Resource Crisis: Regulatory
Regimes for Managing the World's Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 45, 58-59 (2002).
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enforcement in order for a contract-based legal system to work properly
does not mean that contract law creates the wrong incentives. It just
means that contracts without adequate enforcement are not really
contracts. Similarly, if there is not enough enforcement to ensure that a
fisher will not exceed the amount defined by his IQ, then it can be argued
that the IQ is not really a quota. Hilborn et al. (2004) suggest that the
inability to enforce quotas explains why an IQ scheme in British
Columbia’s abalone fishery failed, even though several other IQ regimes
in the same area succeeded.206
Despite the limitations of Bromley’s evidence, it can be concluded
that private ownership is neither absolutely necessary, nor fully sufficient
for socially responsible stewardship. Bromley supplies at least one valid
counterexample to each of these claims, and others can undoubtedly be
found.207 The necessity, or sufficiency, of private ownership, however, is
probably not the most interesting or useful question to address. Bromley
and his opponents might contribute more by accepting that absolute
necessity or full sufficiency do not exist in this case, and by arguing
instead over which approach is likely to work better, and under what
conditions. In short: will some form of property rights generally achieve
greater sustainability and/or lower management costs compared to
alternative schemes which do not include property rights?
It is interesting to point out at this stage that public ownership does
not necessary exclude private ownership.208 A notable example is that of
local customary rights, which play a role in fisheries in, inter alia, New
Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada.209 For example, New
Zealand reserves a proportion of the total catch for indigenous Maoris,
and Alaska has attempted to enable remote communities to use nonprofit organizations to acquire halibut quota.210 As mentioned before,
customary rights are considered public rights in that the rights are
granted to a fluctuating body of members. This view is consistent with
that of Ziff, who points to the overlap between private and common
rights on the one hand, and public and common rights on the other.
Private property can, after all, be owned by a joint group of people who
have been granted common rights.211 Such common rights often create
206. R. Hilborn et al., Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries, 360 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 47, 47-57 (2004).
207. Bromley, supra note 6, at 282.
208. ZIFF, supra note 7, at 8.
209. Stewart, supra note 29, at 116-118.
210. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska, 69 Red. Reg. 23681 (Apr. 30
2004) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679).
211. ZIFF, supra note 7 at 8.
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the perception of public ownership, such as in the case of a highway,
which is in fact owned by public authorities, but to which all members of
the public have a right.212
Bromley’s third “deceit” is the view that ITQs must have an infinite
life and tradability in order to work.213 He provides little or no evidence
against this claim however. The argument that supports perpetuity is part
of the argument that supports the need for property rights. As already
noted, Bromley is unable to attack this argument because he does not
even describe it. In practice, however, it is significant to note that no
jurisdiction has implemented ITQs that are truly perpetual; all regulators
have reserved certain rights to reduce, revoke, or buy back quota.214
Furthermore, all regulators impose at least a few limitations on trading,
such as a cap on the total share that any one person or company can hold,
or reservations of quota for certain groups.215 In other words, Bromley’s
third “deceit” is something of a straw man, as no fishery regulators have
actually set up such a regime.
Bromley identifies an important problem, however, when he
suggests that perpetuity may not provide enough incentive for fishers to
conserve.216 He argues that there is a high risk that other factors outside
anyone’s control could destroy future catches even if fishers do
conserve.217 As a result, he believes that the present value of conserved
fish is too small to be an incentive for conservation.218 The present paper
already noted that the riskiness of future catches could partly explain
why ITQ schemes seem to need significant enforcement effort. Clearly, it
would be valuable to learn more about the riskiness of future catches,
and to assess whether there are ways of reducing the level of
uncertainty.219
Bromley’s fourth “deceit” is the simple claim that ITQs are
property.220 According to Bromley, this is false. ITQs are “permits and
nothing more.”221 In order to support this claim, he quotes American
legislation, which explicitly states that ITQs “shall not create, or be
212. Id.
213. Bromley, supra note 6, at 282-283
214. Stewart, supra note 29.
215. Id.
216. Bromley, supra note 6, at 283.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Richard Barichello & Adam Soliman, ITQs and Fisheries Management: Policy Risk in
Canadian Sablefish, INT’L. AGRIC. TRADE RES. CONSORTIUM (2012), available at
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iat12m:142911.
220. Bromley, supra note 6, at 284.
221. Id.
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construed to create, any right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the
fish is harvested by the holder.”222 As this paper has already shown,
however, the question of whether property rights exist cannot be safely
answered simply by referring to legislation. Precedents, judicial
decisions and constitutional constraints can also create or weaken
property rights.223 The legislation referenced by Bromley is best seen as
an attempt by the legislator to reduce the risk that future court decisions
might create an obligation for the government to pay compensation if it
revokes an ITQ.224 There is no guarantee that such an attempt will
succeed.
In his discussion of the fourth “deceit,” Bromley at one point makes
the strange claim that ITQs are equivalent to TACs, “so when they tell us
that they found 121 fisheries using "catch shares" they should have told
us that they found 121 fisheries in which TAC limits had been
introduced.”225 Although he states the opposite later in the same page (“If
one wished to test the stewardship properties of catch shares (IFQs), the
careful researcher must analyze a large number of TAC-controlled
fisheries and then find some that have introduced IFQs.”), his implication
that ITQ supporters have treated ITQs as equivalent to TACs is false.
Munro et al., for example, focused very strongly on the difference
between TACs with ITQs and TACs without ITQs.226
Bromley also argues that many fisheries economists incorrectly
view ITQs as “property rights.”227 He quotes numerous articles on
fisheries to support this view,228 but misinterprets much of the literature
he quotes. For example, he quotes Leal229 and Arnason,230 and then states
that both authors, according to Bromley, incorrectly claim that ITQs are
private property rights.231 In fact, Leal does not state that ITQs are full
property rights. Instead, he argues that private property rights should be
granted in fisheries.232 He even explicitly acknowledges that the
American legislation quoted by Bromley fails to create such property
rights.233 Arnason also acknowledges that ITQs are not full property
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 285.
226. Munro et al., supra note 50.
227. Bromley, supra note 6, at 285.
228. Id.
229. Leal, supra note 13.
230. Arnason, supra note 14.
231. Bromley, supra note 6, at 283.
232. Leal, supra note 13, at 25-26.
233. Id.
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rights, but makes a case – again – that they should be.234 Therefore,
contrary to Bromley’s statement, neither of the authors claim that ITQs
are private property rights but merely argue that (to a greater or lesser
extent) they ought to be.
Bromley’s final “deceit” is the view that ITQs increase economic
efficiency.235 In an effort to refute this position, he analyzes Figure 1, a
fairly standard graph236 of output (catch) and fishing effort. He attempts
to argue that a fishery operating at effort level E1 is not more “efficient”
than one operating at E3.237 This is inconsistent if “efficiency” is defined
as the ratio between output and input. Both levels of effort produce the
same catch, and, therefore, the same value, but E3 consumes more
resources. Therefore, if a fishery operates at E1 instead of E3, all the
unused resources could be employed in other productive economic
activities. From the viewpoint of maximizing output in the total
economy, E1 is more efficient.

234. Arnason, supra note 14, at 19. Arnason specifically claims that adequate property rights
would be sufficient to solve “the fisheries problem,” which he defines as overcapitalization,
inefficiency, and reduced fish stocks.
235. Bromley, supra note 6, at 286-288.
236. It appears that neither Bromley, nor the authors of the paper from which Bromley extracts
Figure 1, have noticed a peculiar and fundamental error in the graph: the two lines require
completely different measurements on their respective Y axes, and so do not belong on the same
graph at all. The curved “yield” line must be measured in “quantity of fish”, while the straight
“effort” line must be measured in dollars.
237. Id.
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It appears that Bromley’s real complaint is about fairness, not
efficiency.238 In a fishery that operates at E1, the fishers enjoy excess
profits, whereas in a fishery that operates at E3, they receive only normal
profits. To resolve this unfairness, however, does not necessarily require
abandoning efficiency and moving to E3. An appropriate taxation or
royalty structure could reduce inequity by transferring some of that
excess profit to the public as payment of the resource rent to which they
are entitled.239
C. Arguments Supporting ITQs as an Approach to Sustainability
1. Leal and Arnason
Donald Leal argues that government control establishes the wrong
incentives and that stronger private property rights should be established
for American ITQs.240 As noted above, ITQs in the United States have
fewer characteristics of property rights than in most other jurisdictions.241
Though Leal is a proponent of ITQs, he argues that a TAC and ITQs
controlled by the government result in a less efficient fishery than what
could be achieved if ITQs carried full private property rights. 242
According to Leal, the fact that the government is responsible for
setting TACs makes the government the target for fisheries interests
groups lobbying for higher TACs.243 Leal argues that if ITQs gave
enough security and certainty to their owners, then the fishers would
voluntarily “take a longer view and protect the resource,” because they
would want to safeguard their property (the fish) for their own future use
and benefit.244 Fundamentally, this is little more than a restatement of the
original argument, based on the “tragedy of the commons,” which
supports creating some type of property rights for fishers.
Arnason argues that stronger ITQ property rights lead to greater
economic efficiency.245 He argues that a properly structured free market
that enables externalities (such as the long-term impact of overfishing on

238. Id.
239. Matthew Lansford & Laura S. Howorth, Legal Impediments to Limited Entry Fishing
Regulation in the Gulf States, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 411, 431 (1994).
240. Leal, supra note 13.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id. at 22-24.
245. Arnason, supra note 10, at 18-19.
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the stock and on other fishers) to be priced correctly will result in greater
productivity at less cost than any other system. 246
However, Arnason recognizes that social opposition currently limits
further extension of the property right regime.247 He points mostly to the
fact that if property rights are to be granted, current (common) owners
will impliedly be deprived of their existing rights to harvest the
resource.248 Moreover, he points out that social institutions would need to
be overhauled before full property rights could be implemented.249 In the
interim, a temporary situation of uncertainty in regards to property rights
would exist.250
As long as the reward for environmental protection is less than the
reward for economic exploitation, it is easy to see how these incentives
can result in environmentally damaging results. A scheme based on pure
enforcement cannot incentivize proper management of business interests
and environmental protection – such a scheme can only punish.251 The
most obvious and straightforward way to reward conservation is simply
to give the conserver some kind of ownership of what is conserved.252 On
this basis, we can regard Leal and Arnason’s recommendations as efforts
to strengthen the incentives by strengthening and expanding the property
rights which create those incentives. Unfortunately, both authors fail to
clearly set out how a system of full property rights would function. For
instance, these authors do not address the key practical questions of how
property rights could be enforced when fish are perpetually moving
around, and regularly exist as “straddling stocks.”.253
2. The Principal-Agent Model
Munro et al. argues that the Principal-Agent model of game theory
theoretically supports the view that private property regimes such as
ITQs will support sustainability more effectively than systems such as
open access or limited access without individual catch shares.254 In
general, a “principal-agent” situation exists whenever a “principal” who

246. Id.
247. Id. at 19.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 22-23.
250. Id. at 24-25.
251. Bromley, supra note 5, at 281.
252. Id.
253. ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & ALLEN V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 281 (3d ed. 1999).
254. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 4-5.
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has certain interests and goals assigns an “agent” to protect those
interests and achieve those goals.255
In fisheries, the principal is the public (as represented by the
government), and the agents are the fishers, fishing companies, and
fishers’ unions.256 The principal defines the incentive scheme (for
example, regulations) that will apply to the agents, and this scheme,
along with the actions taken by the agents, determines both the returns to
the agents and to the principal.257 We may take it for granted that the
principal has a strong interest in conservation,258 and that the public’s
primary goals are to maintain and, if possible, enrich the fish stock.259
Aligning the interests of the fishers with those of the public and the
government is best accomplished through providing fishers with proper
incentives for stewardship and conservation.260 As evidence that this has
happened, Munro et al. cite significant reductions in TAC overages after
the introduction of ITQs.261 Grimm et al. also state that ITQs have
reduced overages and that they have led to reduced discards (bycatch),
more accurate TACs, and better management options.262
“Bromley’s approach—in which government attempt to achieve
sustainability by using regulations and enforcement—is weakened by the
principle-agent model.”263 Bromley’s argument clearly assumes that a
government regulator will have what might be called “good intentions”;
that is, the regulator will genuinely direct its efforts and knowledge

255. Under the principal-agent model, the degree to which the principal’s interests and goals
are realized depends on the degree to which the principal and agent’s interests are aligned. Game
theory looks at the incentives and mechanisms that can be introduced to align these two interests.
256. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 5.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. From the point of view of game theory, the principal wants to create an incentive
scheme or enforcement system that causes the interests of the agent to be aligned as well as possible
with the interests of the principal. The challenge is therefore to find the right mechanism that will
trigger a shift of interest so that the two interests become aligned. If the incentive scheme does not
achieve this alignment, the result is an incentive gap between the principal and the agents.
260. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 5.
261. Id. at 19-20. Adam Soliman, Impacts of Individual Transferable Quotas in Canadian
Sablefish Fisheries: An Economic Analysis (July 2010) (unpublished M.Sc dissertation, University
of British Columbia) (on file with author). The same authors also report evidence of specific efforts
to support and promote stewardship; both sablefish and groundfish fishers have made voluntary
monetary contributions to support research into stock assessment.
262. Grimm, supra note 204, at 130. Some have suggested that the TAC amount is potentially
vulnerable to lobbying efforts. To date, however, this has only been shown to be a potential threat
rather than a real one and the research conducted in preparing this paper was unable to find hard
evidence that this threat had been realized.
263. Bromley, supra note 6.
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towards socially responsible stewardship.264 This is what is in the
interests of the public, which owns the resource.265
The principal-agent model, however, shows us that the government
is not actually a principal when it regulates a publically owned resource
such as a fish stock.266 At this point, we cannot avoid asking what
mechanisms exist to align the interests of the principal (the public) and
the agent (the government), and how effective these mechanisms are.267
If these mechanisms are weak, then there is little reason to expect the
government regulator to work consistently and strongly to achieve the
public’s goals.268
In general, it appears that the mechanisms that should align the
regulator’s goals and the public’s goals are weak and unreliable.269
Regulators receive no financial benefit if a fish stock is well maintained,
and suffer no financial losses if it is depleted.270271 As for non-financial
motivators, such as unwelcome attention from the news media or
possible lawsuits, these do not appear to happen often or quickly enough
to strongly influence regulators’ behavior.272 Therefore, we cannot
unreservedly accept Bromley’s assumption that regulators will reliably
and effectively pursue the public’s interest.273 This, in turn, calls into
question his conclusion that regulation can be effective without
incentives based on property rights.
3. Leader-Follower Model
Munro et al. argue that the fishers in a catch share or ITQ scheme
may be playing a cooperative game, and that the resource managers are
playing a leader-follower game with the fishers.274 In general, a leaderfollower relationship is a strategic game in economics in which the
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 5. In fact, it is an agent, working on behalf of the public,
which is the true principal.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269 Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
511, 518-520 (2008).
270. Id.
271. In theory, the complete disappearance of a stock could cause regulators to lose their jobs,
but it is equally likely that a serious decline that falls short of disappearance could be used to justify
increased regulation.
272. Id.
273. Bromley, supra note 6.
274. Gordon Munro et al., Catch Shares, the Theory of Cooperative Games and the Spirit of
Elinor Ostrom, INT’L INST. FOR FISHERIES ECON. AND TRADE 4 (July 2012), available at
http://tinyurl.com/ob4uecj.
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leader has some advantage that enables it to move (to take an action)
first, after which the follower acts.275 In fisheries, it exists whenever the
law gives the resource manager authority over the first move (e.g.,
granting access to the fishery resource within a given geographical area),
and the fishermen cannot make their move (i.e., fishing) until that has
happened.276 It is assumed in this model that the resource managers wish
to maximize the profits of the fishers minus the enforcement costs.277
Also, it is assumed that the fishers will attempt to maximize their profits
taking into account the probability of incurring a fine for taking harvests
in excess of the TAC.278
In this model, the resource manager has two instruments at his/her
disposal: (1) the establishment of a TAC; and (2) the control over fishing
effort, which is the enforcement of the TAC.279 Because the TAC is
decided upon prior to the fishing season, the enforcement component is
the only instrument available to the resource manager upon
commencement of the fishing season.280 Munro and his co-authors have
found that the greater the degree of cooperation among fishers, the better
it is for the resource manager.281
In order for cooperation to be feasible, two pre-conditions must be
met: (1) the players must be able to communicate effectively; and (2) the
players must be persuaded that a potential cooperative surplus exists in
the sense that the sum of the expected payoffs to be enjoyed by the
players from cooperation exceeds the sum of the expected payoffs to be
enjoyed under competition.282 If these conditions exist, then cooperation
is feasible, but it is not necessarily stable. In order for a cooperative
game to be stable as well as feasible, further conditions must exist.283
First, the solution to the game must be collectively Rational.284 This
means that when each individual actor (or “player”) acts rationally, their
actions would result in an improvement to the fishing stock. This means
that the most likely outcome from the game, that is when each individual
“player” follows their rational self-action, in the case of fisheries; an
improvement to the fishing stock Second, cooperation must be
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 5.
282. Id. at 6.
283. Id. at 8.
284. Id.
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individually rational, which means that each and every player must
continuously expect that their payoff from the cooperative game will be
at least as great as the payoff that he or she would expect to obtain from
behaving as if it were a competitive game—in other words, cheating.285
There have been many instances throughout history that show that the
consequences of competitive or non-cooperative management of fishery
resources drive fishers toward cooperation with the ultimate consequence
being the absence of degradation of the fish stock.286
4. Further Empirical Evidence
In 2002, Arnason reviewed and assessed ITQ fisheries in eight
countries, addressing the legal and operational nature of each regime, the
economic impact, and any evidence of increased resource stewardship.287
He found statistical and anecdotal evidence that fishers assumed greater
stewardship responsibilities in seven of the eight countries, the exception
being Namibia.288 The strongest evidence appears to come from Iceland,
where the fishing industry cooperates actively to enforce fishing
regulations, and New Zealand, where the fishing industry conducts
biological research and some fisheries are nearly self-managed.289
In previous research, the present author has shown that the ITQ
system that applies to sablefish in British Columbia is reasonably
efficient and effective in its current form.290 This system provides some
incentives that encourage fishers to conserve, maintains fair competition
and allows reasonable access to fisheries, while avoiding excessive
compensation claims and allowing for sufficient government control.291
Taken as a whole, the evidence generally supports the view that
schemes based on some form of property rights are more likely to
achieve socially responsible stewardship with a reasonable level of effort
than schemes based purely on government control and enforcement.292
To a large extent, the creation of ITQs was a response to the observed
failure of older forms of regulation.293 Bromley’s claim that governments
can effectively maintain sustainability is not well supported; even some
of his own evidence conflicts with it.
285. Id.
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D. Other Criticisms of ITQs
Several authors have presented at least two other criticisms of ITQ
schemes which are quite separate from the question of whether or not
they promote sustainability: the unfairness of initial free allocation294 and
the fact that ITQ regimes can enable “armchair fishing.”295
With respect to initial free allocation, Bromley argues that if ITQs
are initially allocated to fishers at no charge, it is unfair to the resource
owners (the public) who should receive a resource rent.296 As noted
above, the apparent reason for allocating without any charge is legal, not
economic: Governments allocate at no charge in order to avoid making
ITQs appear to be full property rights, which could lead to court-ordered
compensation when an ITQ is revoked.297 From an economic perspective
there is no reason why ITQs must be allocated for free.298
Even if this legal risk makes it impossible for governments to
charge a price when ITQs are allocated, is not the only way that the
public could be compensated. It is entirely possible to charge a royalty
for fish caught.299 Royalties would allow the allocation of a quota to
remain free, thus addressing concerns of potential compensation
claims.300 Another possible approach is to increase the charge for
licenses (which are separate from the ITQs) to reflect or approach the fair
market price that otherwise exists for an ITQ.301 One consequence to be
expected is that the value of the quota would decrease—but not
necessarily dissipate—because fishers would need to reallocate part of
the money that they now invest in the ITQ to the license.302 Of course, if
the government charges royalties or increases the license cost, it must not
charge so much that the fisher cannot obtain reasonable profits;
otherwise, the scheme will be ineffective.303304
294. Macinko & Bromley, supra note 15.
295. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 87.
296. Macinko & Bromley, supra note 15.
297. Id.
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299. Suzanne Iudicello et. al., Putting Conservation into the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act: The Public Interest in Magnuson Reauthorization, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 340
(1996).
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301. Lansford & Howorth, supra note 239, at 431.
302. Id.
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304. Further questions remain in this regard: should the public have a proportionate interest in
the accumulated value of quota already freely allocated in the past? Would the public then be able to
sue in restitution? On the other hand, it may not be fair for quota holders to be charged
retrospectively for this accumulated value. These questions require further research and are out of
this paper’s scope.
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Another weakness of ITQ schemes, at least in the view of some
observers, is that they enable “armchair fishing.”305 More properly called
“tenant fishing,” “armchair fishing” occurs when ITQ holders do not fish
themselves, but lease their quota on an annual basis to active fishers.306
This situation occurs partly because when quotas are actively traded,
they are likely to become concentrated in the hands of those who can
afford to pay the most.307 These people may not be the actual fishers;
they might be, for example, professional investors who can obtain capital
at much lower interest rates than most fishers can.308 Some critics
consider this unfair on the grounds that only those who actively fish
should profit from a fishery, or that this practice concentrates the rents
from the fishery into too few hands.309
If a regulator wants to limit this practice, it can be done by such
means as including a requirement that ITQ holders must offer their quota
shares up for sale if they are not participating actively in the fishery, 310
or a tax on profits obtained from ITQ leasing. Whatever the solution, it is
certain to restrict the full and free choice that is normally associated with
true ownership. This again suggests that it would not be useful to modify
ITQs in such a way that they would confer full and unlimited property
rights on their holders.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ITQ schemes do not create full private property rights, but rather
proprietary “interests” that fall short of full ownership.311 They are
neither necessary nor sufficient in themselves for establishing a
sustainable fishery.312 Nevertheless, if carefully designed and managed,
they contribute significantly to this goal.313 Because ITQ schemes create
a long-term proprietary interest in the fish stock, they give fishers an
economic incentive to keep that stock healthy.314 Empirically, many ITQ
fisheries have observed reduced TAC overages and better participation
by fishers in conservation efforts.315
305. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 87.
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It is likely that the limited non-ownership rights that are currently
provided by ITQs are more effective for achieving sustainability than full
property rights would be.316 It is in the interest of the government and the
general public (as owner) for the government to retain the power to
intervene.317 For various reasons, situations can arise in which ITQ
holders might find exploitation rather than stewardship to be in their best
economic interest.318 If sustainable fishing practices are abandoned and
fish stocks are in danger of disappearing, the public interest can only be
protected if the government has the power to intervene, and acts on this
power.319 This type of emergency intervention might not be possible if
the property rights granted to fishers by ITQs were made too secure and
permanent.320
Many existing ITQ systems have weaknesses that are not related to
sustainability or the absence of it.321 These weaknesses can be corrected,
however. First, most ITQ programs initially allocated the quota shares to
fishers at no cost, thus depriving public (as owner of the fish) of any
compensation for what amounts to a type of expropriation.322 This
inequity could be corrected by imposing a royalty or a tax on fishers
based on their catch, which will effectively flow back to the public.
Second, ITQ fisheries often allow a considerable amount of tenant
fishing;323 this could be reduced by such means as applying an active
management requirement to ITQ holders.
In summary, properly designed ITQ schemes using measures such
as those described here can better align the interests of the government,
the public and fishers, thus helping to reach the overall goal of
sustainable fisheries.

316. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 5.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U. N., supra note 102. In some jurisdictions, however,
strengthening the limited form of property rights which fishers hold under this ITQ scheme would
make the scheme more effective. For example, if the U.S. were to implement a registry such as that
used in New Zealand, this would make fishers’ rights more secure. Greater security would generally
increase the value of a fisher’s future takings, by reducing the risk that the fisher’s right to that future
catch might be lost. This would increase the present value of the future income that the fisher can
receive by conserving the stock.
321. Id.
322. Bromley, supra note 6, at 287.
323. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 87.

